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Anatomy of a Dispute Clause:
Intergovernmental Arbitration under the
Spacelab Agreement
By MARY M. LoviK*
Member of the Class of 1982.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the three and one-half decades since World War II, profound
changes have occurred in the nature of inter-state transactions which
present a great challenge in the area of dispute resolution. Rapid ad-
vances in communications and transportation have enabled states to
interact with greater frequency and ease, thus increasing the volume of
inter-state activity and the level of economic interdependence among
states.' However, the technological progress which has facilitated com-
munication between states has also afforded new opportunity for inter-
national discord. The same technological developments which have
thrust states into the frontier areas of outer space and telecommunica-
tions have made it necessary to adapt the international legal regime to
cope with the novel controversies which are bound to arise. These
pressures impact the individual members of the international commu-
nity as well as the community as a whole. Each state's domestic process
for resolving disputes with its neighbors will have to undergo reexami-
nation and change as it responds to the legal challenges of the space
age.
When faced with similar problems engendered by growth and
change in international commercial transactions, private enterprises
have found that the flexibility, speed, and economy of arbitration make
it a particularly useful tool for dispute resolution.' The utility of arbi-
* This study was prepared under the aegis of a joint venture between Hastings Col-
lege of the Law and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration-Ames Research
Center. The author gratefully acknowledges the invaluable guidance of Professor Rudolf B.
Schlesinger and George P. Sloup, Esq.
1. See Katzenstein, International Interdependence: Some Long-Term Trends and Re-
cent Changes, 29 INT'L ORGAN. 1021-34 (1975).
2. See D.T. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL BuslNiss TRANSACTIONS 328-30 (1981); Aksen,
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tration has also not escaped the notice of those who structure transac-
tions between states. Article 33 of the United Nations Charter places
arbitration on an equal footing with judicial settlement as a means of
dispute resolution; furthermore, it has been noted that the advantages
of arbitration over judicial decision by a tribunal such as the Interna-
tional Court of Justice are many.' The influence of the parties over the
constitution of the tribunal, the possibility of a decision ex aequo el
bono for political disputes, and the expediency of arbitral proceedings
in relation to judicial proceedings are frequently listed as positive fea-
tures of arbitration.4 In light of this, it is not surprising that dispute
resolution clauses with provisions for arbitration are found in numer-
ous international agreements currently in force.'
Whild there has not been as much activity in the development of
arbitral practice as there has been in the drafting of arbitration clauses,6
it seems likely that over time the arbitration provisions devised by the
draftsmen will be tested, particularly if the volume of inter-state activ-
ity continues to grow at its present rate. States will need predictable,
workable provisions for enforcing the obligations contained in their
agreements if inter-state business is to function on a large scale. Be-
cause the smooth working of the international legal regime is so depen-
dent on the cooperation of its member states, these provisions will have
International-Arbitration Received Favorably in the U.S., in AMERICAN ARBITRATION Asso-
CIATION, WIDE WORLD OF ARBITRATION 102 (1978).
3. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 (1981).
4. See, e.g, Secretary General of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Circular Note,
54 AM. J. INT'L L. 933 (1960). A decision ex aequo et bono is one in which the arbitrators
are given the power to decide the case without reference to any law, in accordance with their
own notions of fairness and justice. 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1028 (1970).
5. A list of space law instruments with clauses for dispute settlement is found in SET-
TLEMENT OF SPACE LAW DISPUTES 206-411 (K.-H. Backstiegel, ed. 1980). A list of arbitra-
tion clauses relating to air transport is found in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
ORGANIZATION, HANDBOOK ON ADMINISTRATIVE CLAUSES IN BILATERAL AIR TRANSPORT
AGREEMENTS, CIRCULAR 63-AT/6 § XI. See also U.N. SECRETARIAT, OFFICE OF LEGAL
AFFAIRS, SURVEY OF TREATY PROVISIONS FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNA-
TIONAL DISPUTES, 1940-1962, U.N. Doc. 66.V.5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 SURVEY].
6. See Mosler, Problems and Tasks of International Judicial and Arbitral Settlement of
Disputes, in MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUTE, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DIS-
PUTES 3 (1974). See also Mosler, Supra-National Judicial Decisions and National Courts, 4
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 425, 432 (1981).
United States participation in international arbitration has been infrequent. Between
the end of World War II and 1969 it was a party to five arbitrations. Summers, The Senate
and the Arbitration and Adjudication of International Disputes, 3 INT'L LAW. 564, 582 (1969).
In 1978, there was an arbitration between the United States and France under the 1946 U.S.-




to be developed on the domestic as well as on the international level. It
is the purpose of this Note to further understanding of arbitration as a
means of dispute resolution by examining the pertinent clauses of a
"space age" agreement to see how these clauses would operate in prac-
tice. The object of study is the Agreement for a Cooperative Pro-
gramme Concerning the Development of a Space Laboratory,7
concluded in 1973 between the United States government and the
member governments of the European Space Agency (ESA). The is-
sues raised in the process of submitting a dispute to arbitration under
this Agreement will be examined in light of international law and from
the viewpoint of United States domestic law. After a brief historical
overview of the development of arbitration between states in this cen-
tury, this study will address the basic issues presented under interna-
tional law when a dispute is to be submitted to arbitration, namely, the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, the applicable law, constitution of the tribu-
nal, and the subject matter of the dispute. The discussion will then
focus on the domestic requirements for United States involvement in
an arbitral proceeding, asking whether the advice and consent of the
Senate is needed to submit the United States government to
arbitration.9
A. Historical Development
During the first half of the twentieth century, the focus of interna-
tional dispute resolution efforts was on general multilateral treaties
providing for the arbitration of all disputes, or disputes in broadly de-
fined categories.' 0 One of the best known examples of this type of
treaty is the 1907 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of Inter-
7. Aug. 14, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 2049, T.I.A.S. No. 7722 [The Agreement is hereinafter
cited as Agreement; the attached Memorandum of Understanding as Memorandum].
8. ESA's members are Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ire-
land, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Bouraly,
The Legal Status of the European Space Agency, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE
LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL FEDERATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 23D
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 129 (1980) [Hereinafter cited as 23D SPACE
COLLOQUIUM].
9. Other issues beyond the scope of this inquiry concern the enforcement of an arbitral
award and the domestic requirements of the ESA member governments for submitting dis-
putes to arbitration.
10. This Note adopts the definition of arbitration given in the Hague Convention for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, T.I.A.S. 536
[hereinafter cited as 1907 Hague Convention]. Article 37 states that the object of arbitration
is the "settlement of disputes between states by judges of their own choice and on the basis
of respect for law." This Note will not enter into the dispute over the distinction between
international arbitration and international adjudication. Regarding this issue, see von
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national Disputes."' The parties to the Convention recognized that
where diplomacy has failed, arbitration is particularly useful in resolv-
ing "questions of a legal nature . . .especially in the interpretation of
application of international conventions."' 2 The coverage of the 1907
Convention extended to practically all conceivable situations; article 39
states that the Convention is concluded "for all disputes already ex-
isting and for disputes which may arise in the future. . .[for] any dis-
pute or only disputes of a certain category."
A second example of this broad type of multilateral arbitration
convention is the 1929 General Treaty of Interamerican Arbitration."
This treaty was aimed at arbitration of "all differences of an interna-
tional character which have arisen or may arise. . . which are juridical
in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the appli-
cation of the principles of law."' 4 Still another effort at providing gen-
eralized rules for arbitration was the 1928 General Act for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes,' 5 which went even further in its
coverage than either the Hague or Interamerican Conventions. The
1928 Act extended its provisions to "any dispute," legal or nonlegal. 6
General agreements of the type just described did not prove to be
of much practical use. States refused to accept obligatory proceedings
under agreements which covered such a potentially broad range of sub-
ject matter. The Interamerican Treaty's provisions for compulsory ar-
bitration were accepted by the United States Senate only with the
reservation that any agreement submitting the U.S. government to ar-
bitration under the Treaty be concluded subject to its advice and con-
sent.' 7 The 1907 Hague Convention, which for the most part lacked
compulsory provisions,'" met with the same fate before the wary U.S.
Senate.'9 The 1928 General Act and its 1949 successor were never suc-
Mangoldt, Arbitration and Conciliation, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL Dis-
PUTES, supra note 6, at 417, 424-28.
11. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 10.
12. Id. art. 38.
13. Jan. 5, 1929, 130 L.N.T.S. No. 135.
14. Id. art. 1.
15. Sept. 26, 1928, 93 L.N.T.S. 345 [hereinafter cited as 1928 Act]. In 1949 the U.N.
General Assembly adopted the Revised General Act for the Pacific Settlement of Interna-
tional Disputes, April 28, 1949, 71 U.N.T.S. 101 [hereinafter cited as Revised General Act],
with the intent of reaffirming the efficacy of the 1928 General Act. 71 U.N.T.S. 101, 102 n.2.
The two Acts are essentially the same.
16. 1928 Act, supra note 15, art. 21.
17. See Garner, The Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration of 1929, 13 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 129 (1932).
18. Limited compulsory provisions are contained in art. 53.
19. The United States reservation read:
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cessfully implemented. Although twenty-four states signed the 1928
Act, many did so with significant reservations, and there is some doubt
as to whether this treaty is still valid; only seven states have signed the
1949 Act.20 At the time the General Act was under consideration in
1928, arguments expressed by the United Kingdom illustrate character-
istic objections to overly broad obligations to arbitrate disputes:
In contracting an international obligation towards another State a
country must take into account the nature of its relations with that
State. Obligations which it may be willing to accept towards one
State it may not be willing to accept towards another. Reservations
and exceptions which it may think necessary as regards one State
may not be considered necessary as regards another. The method of
signing a general undertaking, even when coupled with the power to
make exceptions as to the categories of disputes to be arbitrated,
lacks the flexibility which enables the measure of the obligation to be
varied in the case of the particular States towards which the obliga-
tion is being accepted.21
In light of the above, it is not surprising that the tendency since
World War II has been to limit the scope of provisions for arbitration
to more narrowed, manageable areas. A 1948 U.N. survey of dispute
resolution treaties catalogues 207 agreements over a twenty-year period
which deal exclusively with dispute settlement in a general context.22
[T]he United States approves this convention with the understanding that recourse
to the permanent court for the settlement of differences can be had only by agree-
ment thereto through general or special treaties of arbitration heretofore or hereaf-
ter concluded between the parties in dispute; and the United States now exercises
the option contained in Article 53 of said convention, to exclude the formulation of
the 'compromis' by the permanent court, and hereby excludes from the competence
of the permanent court the power to frame the 'compromis' required by general or
special treaties of arbitration concluded or hereafter to be concluded by the United
States, and further expressly declares that the 'compromis' required by any treaty
of arbitration to which the United States may be a party shall be settled only by
agreement between the contracting parties, unless such treaty shall expressly pro-
vide otherwise.
1907 Hague Convention, supra note 10, at 577 n.1 (emphasis added).
20. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 64-65 (1981). The 1928 Act was
never signed by the United States, the U.S.S.R., or Germany; in 1939, France, Great Britain,
India, New Zealand, and Australia announced that they did not recognize the 1928 General
Act in conflicts essentially connected with a war. The seven states which have signed the
1949 Act are Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Up-
per Volta. Id.
21. H. CORY, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES 148 (1932).
22. U.N. SECRETARIAT, SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF TREATIES FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLE-
MENT OF DISPUTES, 1928-1948, U.N. Doc. 1949.V.3 (1948). See also M. HABICHT, POST-
WAR TREATIES FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES (1931);
LEAGUE OF NATIONS SECRETARIAT, SYSTEMATIC SURVEY OF THE ARBITRATION CONVEN-
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This is in sharp contrast to a later survey, which recorded only eight
such treaties.23 The later survey catalogues arbitration provisions in
specific areas of inter-state activity, some of which were not covered by
treaties prior to World War II. These areas include human rights, com-
merce and transportation, trade and economic cooperation, treatment
of nationals, national security, and boundary disputes.24
At first blush, it appears that a major obstacle to the development
of inter-state arbitration practice has been overcome. Nonetheless, re-
cent experience shows that the development of comprehensive interna-
tional arbitration practice has lagged behind the proliferation of
provisions in inter-state agreements. 25 One commentator notes that ar-
bitration has been of most practical use in resolving disputes involving
such traditional subjects as diplomatic protection of nationals, debt set-
tlement, postal disputes, border disputes, and the law of the sea.26 This
is not to say that mechanisms for arbitration have not been devised in
agreements concerning the less traditional areas of state activity which
have emerged with the advances in communication and technology
since World War II. The Convention on International Civil Aviation27
and its companion agreements-the International Air Services Transit
Agreement28 and the International Air Transport Agreement2 9-are
examples of international documents establishing elaborate machinery
for the resolution of air transport disputes.3" Arbitration procedures
are also set forth in the INTELSAT3 and INMARSAT12 agreements,
as well as under the International Telecommunications Convention. 33
Unfortunately, these arbitration provisions remain largely untested in
practice. In the area of civil aviation, for example, state practice has
evidenced a preference for dispute resolution by diplomatic means
TIONS AND TREATIES OF MUTUAL SECURITY DEPOSITED WITH THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS,
V.Legal 27.V.29; ARBITRATION TREATIES AMONG THE AMERICAN NATIONS (W.R. Manning
ed. 1924).
23. 1966 SURVEY, supra note 5.
24. Id. at 3.
25. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
26. von Mangoldt, supra note 10, at 466-67.
27. Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
28. Jan. 30, 1945, 59 Stat. 1693, E.A.S. No. 487, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
29. Feb. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1701, E.A.S. No. 488, 171 U.N.T.S. 387.
30. See T. BUERGENTHAL, LAW-MAKING IN THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION OR-
GANIZATION, 123-97 (1969).
31. Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532, Annex C [hereinafter cited as
INTELSAT Agreement].
32. July 16, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 9605, Annex [hereinafter cited as INMAR-
SAT Agreement].
33. Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 1761, T.I.A.S. No. 4892, Annex 4.
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rather than by the arbitration mechanism in the International Civil
Aviation agreements.34
The point has been made that the development of rigid rules of
arbitral practice would not be a good thing for the future use of arbitra-
tion. Georges Scelle, reporter for the International Law Commission's
Model Rules for Arbitral Procedure, noted that many states objected to
the formulation of the rules in a draft convention because it was felt
that this would distort the traditional institution of arbitration, turning
it into a judicial proceeding. 35 Those objecting noted that one strength
of arbitration is its flexibility and asserted that rigid rules would detract
from the freedom of the parties to determine the shape of the arbitra-
tion.36 Scelle remarked:
It may be thought that there is ... no general custom with regard to
arbitral procedure, for the simple reason that practice has shown it to
be desirable that the compromis of arbitration should be the direct
outcome of the will of the parties and that consequently they should
vary according to the circumstances surrounding the dispute and the
importance of the interests at stake. It might prove a difficult matter
even to discern the local customs peculiar to any given group of
states.
37
The point made by these commentators is no doubt well-taken.
This may be reflected in the fact that between 1958 and 1972, the I.L.C.
Model Rules were never used. 8 However, the lack of developed rules
of dispute resolution in the context of a particular dispute may be a
decisive factor in a state's decision not to resort to arbitration. One
commentator has noted:
States do not desire that international judges be legislators in their
own affairs. The border line between adjudication and legislation
.. . becomes blurred when the applicable international law is not yet
sufficiently concise, but open to further elaboration, as in the case of
an international treaty containing formal compromises and general
clauses to be defined and worked out more precisely.39
34. T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 30, at 123-24. See also Steinberger, The International
Court of Justice, in JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES, supra note 6, at
193, 228.
35. [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 2-3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958. See also K.S.
CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 30-33 (1946).
36. [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 35, at 2-3.
37. Id. (emphasis in original).
38. See von Mangoldt, supra note 10, at n.100.
39. von Mangoldt, Methods of Dispute Settlement in Public International Law, in SET-
TLEMENT OF SPACE LAW DISPUTES, supra note 5, at 15, 21 (1980). See also Steinberger,
supra note 34, at 227-28.
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If it is true that states do not wish judges to "legislate" in the area of
arbitration by defining for a particular case the precise principles of
applicable international law, then the future of arbitration between
states lies in the development of clear, workable procedures to guide
international tribunals. Many models for international arbitral prac-
tice are already in existence, even if they are not much used; these will
be examined below as guidelines for arbitration under the NASA/ESA
Agreement. First, however, the discussion turns to the NASA/ESA
Agreement itself.
B. The NASA/ESA Agreement
The NASA/ESA Agreement binds the U.S. government to pro-
cure two Spacelabs from the member governments of the European
Space Agency.40 The first Spacelab was produced in a joint coopera-
tive program, with each side bearing the cost of its own participation.41
The second Spacelab is to be procured from ESA by NASA.42 The
U.S. government will pay the European partners for this unit, the cost
of which is estimated at $184 million in 1979 U.S. dollars.43
The agreement to build the Spacelabs is to date contained in three
documents. The basic agreement is the inter-governmental agreement
between the U.S. and the ESA member states, which sets out the gen-
eral parameters of the transaction.' Attached to the general agreement
is a memorandum of understanding, concluded between NASA and
ESA on behalf of their respective governments, which sets forth "the
particular terms and conditions under which such association and coor-
dination will be effected. '' 45 The third document is a contract signed in
December, 1979, for long-lead items for the second Spacelab.46 This
final document was also negotiated between the agencies on behalf of
their governments.
The Agreement, Memorandum, and Contract all contain dispute
resolution clauses foreseeing arbitration as an alternative. There are
40. Agreement, supra note 7, art. 1, Memorandum, art. VIII.
41. Agreement, supra note 7, arts. 1, 7(E), 8.
42. Memorandum, supra note 7, art. VIII(l); 1981 N4S4 Authorization Hearings: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Space Science andApplications of the House Comm. on Science
and Technology, 96th Cong., 2d sess. 1342 (1980) (statement of Dr. Glynn S. Lunney) [here-
inafter cited as 1981 NASA Authorization Hearings].
43. 1981 NASA Authorization Hearings, supra note 42, at 1345.
44. Agreement, supra note 7.
45. Memorandum, supra note 7, preamble.
46. NASA-33600, effective Jan. 28, 1980 [hereinafter cited as Contract]. See 1981
NAS.4 Authorization Hearings, supra note 42, at 1342.
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two types of clauses in these documents, each type imposing different
obligations on the parties. Article ll(B) of the Agreement is specifi-
cally designed to govern a subject matter familiar to international arbi-
tration, providing for the sharing of payment for damage claims by
nationals of countries which are not parties to the Agreement:
B. In the event of damage, arising from the launch, flight or descent
of the Shuttle carrying the SL, to nationals of countries which are not
parties to this Agreement, for which damage there is joint liability of
the Government of the United States of America and the European
Partners under the principles of international law or of the Conven-
tion on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
the Government of the United States of America and the European
Partners agree to consult promptly on an equitable sharing of the
payment for any settlement required. If agreement is not reached
within 180 days, the Government of the United States of America
and the European Partners will act promptly to arrange for early ar-
bitration to settle the sharing of such claims following the 1958
model rules on arbitral procedure of the International Law
Commission.47
The second type of clause is intended to cover disputes in general,
and is therefore drafted in non-specific terms. Generally, the clauses in
question call for diplomatic negotiation as the first step toward resolv-
ing disputes arising under these provisions, to be followed by arbitra-
tion where the parties so agree. An example is article 12 of the
Agreement:
The resolution of any dispute as to the implementation of the cooper-
ative programme will be the responsibility of the agencies referred to
in Article 3 of this Agreement. Only a dispute which, in the view of
the Government of the United States of America or the European
Partners, seriously and substantially prejudices the execution of the
cooperative programme may be referred for resolution to a represen-
tative of the Government of the United States of America and to a
representative of the European Partners. If these representatives are
unable to resolve the dispute, it may be submitted for such arbitra-
tion as may be agreed.48
Article XIV of the Memorandum states:
1. Any disputes in the interpretation or implementation of the
47. Agreement, supra note 7. The Liability Convention is discussed at note 111 and
accompanying text infra.
48. Agreement, supra note 7, art. 12.
No. 2]
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terms of this cooperative programme shall be referred to the NASA
Administrator and the Director General of ESRO for settlement.
2. Should the NASA Administrator and the Director General of
ESRO be unable to resolve such disputes, they may be submitted to
such other form of resolution or arbitration as may be agreed.49
Finally, Article XI of the Contract states:
If any dispute, whether or not involving ai alleged breach of this
Contract, concerning a question of fact arising under this Contract
and which is not disposed of by agreement, either party may mail or
otherwise furnish a written appeal addressed to the NASA Adminis-
trator and ESA Director General. The joint decision of the NASA
Administrator and ESA Director General or their duly authorized
representatives for the determination of such appeals shall be final
and conclusive, unless being a question of law and/or unless other-
wise determined by court of competent jurisdiction . . . . Should
the NASA Administrator and the Director General of ESA be un-
able to resolve such disputes, they may be submitted to such other
form of resolution or arbitration as may be agreed. 50
These clauses-particularly the latter two-are representative of
the provisions for dispute resolution which occur in modem inter-state
agreements. An analysis of how arbitral proceedings would be initi-
ated under them will therefore be instructive, regardless of whether a
dispute arising from the NASA/ESA Agreement is in fact brought to
arbitration.
I. SUBMITTING A DISPUTE TO ARBITRATION
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES
A. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
The first step which must be taken in submitting a dispute to arbi-
tration is to secure the jurisdiction of the tribunal. Since no interna-
tional tribunal may exercise jurisdiction over a state without that state's
consent, one government may not summon another to an arbitration
49. Memorandum, supra note 7, art. 14. ESRO (The European Space Research Organi-
zation) is the legal predecessor to ESA, ESA having assumed all of ESRO's legal obligations
on the entry into force of the ESA Convention. See Convention for the Establishment of a
European Space Agency, May 30, 1975, art. XXI, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS [I.L.M.], 855,
864; Kaltenecker, The New European Space Agency, 5 J. SPACE L. 37 (1977); Bourdly, The
LegalFramework ofthe Spacelab/Space Shuttle Programs, 4 J. SPACE L. 77, 81 (1976). The
ESRO Convention, June 14, 1962, is cited at 528 U.N.T.S. 33.
50. Contract, supra note 46, art. 11.
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proceeding without a clear expression of mutual agreement.5' The
manner in which consent to submit to arbitration is evidenced differs,
depending upon whether the parties wish to arbitrate a dispute already
in existence, or to set up a framework within which disputes arising in
the future can be arbitrated.
Where the parties agree to submit an existing dispute to an arbitral
tribunal, and no prior obligation to resolve the dispute in this manner
exists, the proceedings begin when the parties reach a compromis. The
compromis confers jurisdiction on the tribunal by expressing the con-
sent of the parties to be bound by its decisions. The compromis speci-
fies the conditions under which the arbitration will take place,
establishing the tribunal to handle only the single case at hand or a
group of cases arising out of one transaction. Such important matters
as the applicable law, the composition of the tribunal, and the subject
matter of the dispute will be to a greater or lesser extent settled in the
compromis. This agreement may also provide for a third party to assist
the disputants in naming arbitrators.-2
Where the parties undertake to submit disputes arising in the fu-
ture to arbitration, they will generally express their consent to the juris-
diction of the tribunal in a binding international agreement.5 3 This
agreement may include provisions for the substantive and procedural
matters listed above, but it is not unusual for the parties to conclude a
separate compromis making provisions for individual cases arising
under the general agreement.54 Where an agreement to arbitrate future
disputes is well-drafted and binding, failure of the parties to conclude a
separate compromis will not be fatal to the proceedings, especially if
provision is made for third party assistance in constituting the tribunal.
Because they involve long-term obligations by the contracting par-
ties, agreements to arbitrate future disputes are most feasible where the
disputes foreseen and the procedures governing the arbitration are
clearly defined. Where there is no clear definition of the issues or pro-
cedures, the parties will be reluctant to enter a binding agreement to
arbitrate future disputes.5 It is thus not surprising that most intergov-
ernmental agreements to arbitrate involve submission of existing dis-
51. L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (H. Lauterpacht 7th ed. 1955); K.S. CARL-
STON, supra note 35, at 62.
52. See 12 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1047-48 (1970).
53. von Mangoldt, supra note 10, at 424.
54. Id.
55. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
No. 2]
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putes 6 Agreements of this type allow more flexibility than do
agreements to arbitrate in the future; no long-term obligation to resolve
disputes in a fixed manner is imposed on the parties. With either type
of agreement, however, it should be remembered that arbitration is a
consensual process which will not succeed unless both sides to the dis-
pute are willing to cooperate. Attempts to compel states to arbitrate
their disputes have generally not met with much success.57
The NASA/ESA Agreement provides for resolution of both ex-
isting and future disputes. Article 1 I(B) of the Agreement, which sets
up a regime for division of damage payments governed by the I.L.C.
Model Rules, is an example of a provision for arbitration of a narrow
category of disputes foreseen in the future. Article 12 of the Agree-
ment, article XIV of the Memorandum, and article XI of the Contract
are designed to cover a wide range of disputes; to provide flexibility,
the draftsmen of these articles provided for a variety of dispute resolu-
tion techniques, with arbitration by compromis being one possibility. 8
Should a dispute regarding a payment for a damage claim arise
under article 11 (B) of the Agreement, the parties would find that they
have consented to a compulsory system of dispute resolution with
many safeguards against uncooperative efforts to undo the proceedings.
Although the I.L.C. Rules are entitled "Model" rules, they become
binding on the parties by virtue of their embodiment in a written un-
dertaking by which the parties agree to have recourse to arbitration. 9
Although a compromis setting forth the parties' wishes on the conduct
of the proceedings would greatly facilitate matters, the absence of such
an agreement does not prevent the undertaking from being binding nor
does it frustrate the proceedings." Where the parties fail to agree on
the issue of the applicable law, for instance, the tribunal is to apply law
derived from sources similar to those used by the International Court
of Justice.61 Where the parties cannot agree on the constitution of the
tribunal, the President of the I.C.J. may step in to appoint arbitrators.62
56. von Mangoldt, supra note 10, at 488-89.
57. See Williams, Dispute Settlement According to the Conventions on INMARSAT and
INTEL SAT, in SETTLEMENT OF SPACE LAW DISPUTES, supra note 5, at 63.
58. See text accompanying notes 47-50 supra.
59. [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 35, at 80-83 (preamble).
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id. at 8, 84 (I.L.C. MODEL RULES, art. 8). These sources of law are listed in article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and are: international conventions
expressly recognized by the contesting states, international custom, general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations, judicial decisions, and teachings of publicists.
62. [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 35, at 4-6, 83-84 (I.L.C. MODEL RULES,
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The I.C.J. may also decide whether the subject matter of the dispute is
subject to the obligation to arbitrate.63
Once constituted, the tribunal may hear one side of a dispute to
decide whether there is enough agreement on the essential elements of
the controversy to force the parties to conclude a compromis.64 The
fact that the rules have not been extensively employed should not
greatly hamper their usefulness where the parties are sincere in their
wish to resolve their differences. Indeed, the section 1 (B) dispute set-
ting seems to be the ideal place to use the Model Rules; since the rigid
procedures which they impose are narrowly confined to the area of
sharing damage payments, the arguments of those who see a need for
flexibility are weakened.65
Unlike article ll(B), the other dispute resolution clauses in the
NASA/ESA Agreement anticipate a broad range of possible disagree-
ments. Because of the need for flexibility, the nature of the obligation
incurred is much more nebulous. In all these clauses, the parties agree
to negotiate their differences, and this failing, they "agree to agree" on
an alternative form of dispute resolution, with arbitration as one
possibility.
This type of provision is often used in anticipation of unforeseen
future disputes.66 It is known as a pactum de contrahendo and is of
limited legal effect.6 7 While it is not so uncertain as to make the agree-
ment unenforceable,68 the only obligation imposed by this sort of ar-
rangement is the obligation to negotiate.69 This obligation is a serious
one which has been upheld by the International Court of Justice. In
the North Sea Continental Shelf Case, the Court held that negotiations
pursuant to inter-state agreements must be carried on with the intent of
resolving the dispute. The parties are not bound to actually reach
agreement; however, they must make a good faith attempt to do so. 70
Any dispute arbitrated under these clauses would necessarily be an
existing one, as there is no provision for binding the parties to arbitrate
art. 4). The I.C.J. President is not obligated to accept this role. See text accompanying note
110 infra.
63. [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 35, at 5, 83 (I.L.C. MODEL RULES, art. 3).
64. Id. at 7-8, 84 (I.L.C. MODEL RULES, art. 9).
65. See note 36 and accompanying text supra.
66. J.L. SIMPSON & H. Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 44 (1959).
67. Id.
68. Mann, Reflections on a CommercialLaw ofNations, in F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 140, 155 (1973).
69. J.L. SIMPSON & H. Fox, supra note 66, at 44-45.
70. 1969 I.C.J. 3, 46-48.
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future disputes. Jurisdiction would be conferred by a compromis sub-
mitting a particular disagreement to arbitration. The parties would
have to negotiate on the issues which under article 11(B) are resolved
by the I.L.C. Rules. The following sections of this Note will look to
other international agreements to see what solutions have been pro-
posed, and to investigate what options are available to the United
States and the ESA governments should they submit a dispute to arbi-
tration under the general dispute clauses. 7'
B. The Applicable Law
One of the first problems that the parties will face in the negotia-
tion of their compromis of arbitration is the determination of the appli-
cable law which will govern the procedural, substantive, and choice of
law questions raised throughout the arbitral proceedings. There are
two possibilities available to the parties with regard to the applicable
law; the proceedings can be governed either by public international law
or by the private municipal law of a particular nation.
It is generally assumed that public international law should govern
where the disputants are states or international persons (such as the
United Nations).72 The parties may expressly provide that public inter-
national law will govern the arbitration, but public international law is
also the preferred legal regime where the parties have made no provi-
sions at all regarding the applicable law.73
In ascertaining the specific rules of public international law, the
parties or the tribunal will look to the sources listed in article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice. These are international
conventions expressly recognized by the contesting states, international
custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, judi-
cial decisions, and the writings of publicists. Private municipal law has
but a limited place in this system of norms. Municipal law is the source
of the "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,"
which according to the I.C.J. Statute are applied in the absence of un-
ambiguous treaty provisions or rules of customary international law ac-
71. Although the balance of the discussion in this section will be directed to arbitration
provisions under the general dispute clauses, it also has relevance to arbitration under sec-
tion 11(B) of the Agreement. If the parties wish, they could by a separate compromis con-
tract out of proceedings governed by the I.L.C. Rules and structure the arbitration
differently. In this event, the models and suggestions presented in the rest of this section of
the Note would be pertinent to their negotiations.
72. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 51, at 24.




cepted by the parties.74 In practice, the general principles of law have
not been very significant in the resolution of international disputes.75
One reason is that they are often so general as to be meaningless; also,
they are rarely suitable for use in disputes involving subjects of interna-
tional law.76
When they are used, however, these general private law principles
are applied by analogy in determining the rights and obligations of dis-
puting states. Principles of contract law such as the requirement of
minimal definiteness, for example, can be applied by analogy to the law
of treaties. One commentator, noting the recent redefinition of the na-
ture of international state activity, has observed that analogy to munici-
pal law may be particularly useful where governments enter into
agreements which closely resemble such private law transactions as
sales, exchanges, loans, and leases.77
The logical extension of the use of analogy would be to apply pri-
vate municipal law to inter-state transactions which are of a fundamen-
tally commercial nature, as distinguished from those of a political
nature. A similar process has already occurred with respect to the doc-
trines of sovereign immunity7 and act of state,79 where the increase in
commercialized activity by states made it necessary to distinguish be-
tween political and commercial transactions in order to prevent states
from escaping their commercial obligations. Without the commercial
exceptions to these doctrines, many important international transac-
tions would be exceedingly difficult to manage. Thus, where public in-
74. 1 R.B. SCHLESINGER, FORMATION OF CONTRACTS 7-8 (1968).
75. Id. at 8-9.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 9-10.
78. Under the classic doctrine of sovereign immunity, a sovereign state was absolutely
immune from suit in the courts of another sovereign unless the immunity was waived by an
expression of consent. Under the newer "restrictive theory" of sovereign immunity, immu-
nity is recognized only as to sovereign or public acts (ure imperii), but not with respect to
private acts (lure gestionis). See The Tate Letter, May 19, 1952, 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984
(1952); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1441(d),
1602-1611 (1976); Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank [1977] 1 All E.R. 884, 892-94.
79. The classic statement of the United States position with regard to the Act of State
doctrine is found in Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897): "Every sovereign
State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory."
An exception to this doctrine was carved out in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Re-
public of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976), where the Court held: "[Tihe concept of an act of
state should not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely commercial obligation
owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its commercial instrumentalities."
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ternational law has not developed at the same pace as the commercial
practice of nations, it would also seem reasonable to permit states to
select the private municipal law of a chosen jurisdiction t6 govern their
commercial transactions.
The theoretical possibility of distinguishing commercialized and
political inter-governmental transactions for purposes of choice of law
has long been recognized but has rarely occurred in practice."0 How-
ever, a recent trend toward commercialization of space activities is
making this distinction more useful. For example, management of
ESA's Ariane space launcher, which places satellites into orbit for pri-
vate and public customers,8 1 has been turned over to Arianespace, a
private law company whose shareholders include the French national
space agency, thirty-six European aerospace firms, and eleven banks.8 2
Despite the fact that it was established as an independent private enter-
prise, Arianespace remains closely connected with the French govern-
ment.83 In response to this European competition and the budget
restraints of the current administration, NASA is presently considering
its own proposal for private procurement of a fifth Shuttle orbiter
which will operate as a regular part of the present fleet. 84 NASA is also
considering shifting to private industry the responsibility for Shuttle
processing, tie., refurbishing the vehicle after flight and preparing it for
80. See H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 5 (1927); Bockstiegel, Settlement of Disputes in International Regimes Applicable
to Space Activities, in 23D SPACE COLLOQUIUM, supra note 8, at 123, 125.
One scholar has catalogued loan agreements between Denmark and five third world
nations which are expressly governed by Danish law. Mann, About the Proper Law of Con-
tracts Between States, in F. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 68, at 241.
The clause in question stated: "Unless otherwise provided for in the Agreement, the Agree-
ment and all the rights and obligations deriving from it shall be governed by Danish law."
Id. at 247. Mann did not believe that this clause was intended to apply to the arbitration
provisions under these agreements. Id. at 250 n.l.
Mann has also commented upon a 1973 decision by the German Federal Supreme
Court which held that an agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic for
the return of paintings claimed by the United States under its Trading with the Enemy Act
was impliedly governed by U.S. domestic law. Mann, Another Agreement Between States
under National Law? 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 490, 493 (1974).
81. Two private U.S. customers have been Western Union and the Southern Pacific
Communications Co. See ESA sAriane Launcher Selectedfor Southern Pacfc Satellite, Av.
WK. & SPACE TECH., Dec. 21, 1981, at 12.
82. Arianespace Completing PayloadPlans, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., July 6, 1981, at 19.
83. Arianespace Markets Launch Service, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan 11, 1982, at 90-
91.
84. Investment Firm Unit Considers Private Buy of Space Shuttle, Av. WK. & SPACE




Japan, Brazil, and India are also developing launch vehicles for
commercial use.86 This entry into the space market place of competi-
tors who are public, private, or a mixture of both has surely set the
traditionally separated public and private international law regimes on
a collision course.87 Old notions which divided the two for choice of
law purposes are no longer sufficient to cope with modern exigencies;
one means of adapting to this change may be to subject commercialized
inter-state ventures to a private law dispute regime.
One problem with private law intergovernmental transactions will
be the complexity generated by such arrangements. Subjecting dis-
putes between states to private law arbitration will cause thorny practi-
cal problems regarding state sovereignty and the anchoring of the
arbitration. States may be more reluctant to submit to the laws of an-
other state than they would be to international law; it would also be
difficult to devise principles for choosing a seat for the arbitration.
Furthermore, it is arguable that subjecting inter-state transactions to
municipal law would have a regressive effect on the development of
principles of public international law governing commercialized trans-
actions between states.88 The biggest obstacle, however, is the thresh-
old problem of classifying a transaction as "commercial" and therefore
amenable to a municipal law regime. Much has been written on the
definition of comerciality for the purpose of sovereign immunity, and
the difficulties are not fully resolved.8 9 The problem would no doubt
remain in classifying a transaction as "commercial" for purposes of
choice of law.
Commentators and legislators have suggested various criteria for
determining when a transaction is commercial. The formulation of the
transaction in a contract rather than in a treaty would be one indication
85. Processing Efficiencies of Shuttle Studied, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 30, 1981, at
18.
86. Arianespace Markets Launch Service, supra note 83, at 91-92.
87. This problem is by no means one of minor economic importance. As of December,
1981, Arianespace had logged sales orders worth approximately $428.5 million, 40% of
which originated outside the European Economic Community. It is anticipated that 200
satellites will be orbited during 1983-1990. Id. at 91, 93-95.
88. For a discussion of the development of public international law principles dealing
with commercialized inter-state transactions, see Mann, supra note 68.
89. See, e.g., Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
308-10 (2d Cir. 1981); Kahale & Vega, Immunity andJurisdiction: Towarda Uniform Body of
Law n Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 236 (1979).
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of its commercial nature.90 The assumption of commercial rather than
sovereign functions by the states would also indicate a commercial na-
ture, as would state action without reference to sovereign rights.9' The
United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 states that
"[t]he commercial character of an activity shall be determined by refer-
ence to the nature of the. . act, rather than by reference to its pur-
pose."92 Other nations, however, take a different view of the same
matter, contending that the purpose of the state's act determines
whether or not the act is commercial. 93
Perhaps the most critical factor in the determination of choice of
law in international arbitration is the intent of the parties. The West
German Federal Supreme Court has found implied intent to be gov-
erned by municipal law, although this decision has met with strong and
justifiable criticism.94 In light of the strong precedent favoring the use
of public international law where an agreement is silent, the better view
seems to be that only an express provision by the parties to the con-
trary will overcome the presumption favoring international law as the
governing legal regime.
Even where a workable definition of "commercial" exists, the
problem of mixed transactions remains. 95 Where an international
agreement contains both commercial and political elements, it would
be difficult to define the degree of commerciality needed before the
transaction could be submitted to municipal law. Given the fact that
the presumption in favor of public international law is so strong, it
seems logical to assume that an agreement would have to be over-
whelmingly commercial before private law would apply.
In applying the above principles to the NASA/ESA Agreement,
the cooperative and cost-reimbursable programs should be distin-
guished.96 Arbitration under the cooperative program would best be
conducted under public international law, as the transaction involved
fails to meet the threshold test of commerciality. The Agreement is cast
as a treaty rather than as a contract. The parties have entered into it in
the exercise of their functions as states; the preamble to the Agreement
90. Mann, The Law Governing State Contracts, 21 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. II, 25 (1944);
B6ckstiegel, supra note 80.
91. Mann, supra note 90, at 25.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 69 (1965).
94. See note 80 supra.
95. Mann, supra note 90, at 24.
96. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
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speaks of such noncommercial goals as to "strengthen the bonds of
friendship between the countries involved and. . . contribute to world
peace." Also, this is not in purpose or nature the sort of transaction
into which private commercial entities usually enter. No profit is ex-
pected; indeed, it may well be against ESA's commercial interests to
assist NASA in development of equipment for the Shuttle, which will
soon be directly competing with ESA's Ariane project for launch cus-
tomers.97 Finally, the parties have not expressed any intent that the
agreement should be governed by private law nor is there any language
from which such intent may be inferred. Of course, the parties have
not yet had the opportunity to fully express themselves on this matter
with regard to any particular dispute; should a compromis be con-
cluded, its language will have to be examined for expressions of intent.
Given the nature of the cooperative program, however, there is no rea-
son to expect that the parties will wish to arbitrate under private law.
Although the cost-reimbursable program contains more commer-
cial elements than does the cooperative program, it is also not a likely
candidate for arbitration under private law. The transaction is partly
formulated in a contract concluded under the original Agreement.
This is not determinative, however. According to the Armed Services
Procurement Regulations, intergovernmental contracts are to be gov-
erned by the underlying treaty provisions relating to a particular issue
(such as dispute resolution) which may arise under the contract.98 The
fact that money is being paid by the U.S. government is also not dispos-
itive, because the parties expressly renounce any profit motives in the
preamble to the Contract.99 Given these circumstances, as well as the
absence of expression of intent to the contrary by the parties, it seems
unlikely that disputes arising under the cost-reimbursable program will
be governed by private law. As is the case with the cooperative agree-
ment, however, it will be necessary to look to the particular compromis
between the parties to reach a definite conclusion on this issue. It is
conceivable that where a dispute arises under the Contract which is not
97. See text accompanying notes 81-85 supra. Ariane currently is in competition with
the U.S. Delta launcher. It is anticipated that the Shuttle will be declared operational after
its fourth flight later in 1982, after which time NASA will be making arrangements for use of
the Shuttle as a launch vehicle. Arianespace Markets Launch Service, supra note 83, at 93-
95.
98. 5 GOV'T CoNT. REP. 35, 271, 33,581. The Armed Services Procurement Act was
made applicable to NASA by § 301(b) of the Space Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2472(b) (1981). See
also 10 U.S.C. § 2303 (1981).
99. Contract supra note 46.
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covered by the underlying international agreement, the parties will
wish to have the matter governed by private law.
C. Constitution of the Tribunal
A second important issue to be decided under thepactum de con-
trahendo is the constitution of the tribunal. Once the tribunal has been
formed, it can resolve many of the preliminary issues itself;' without a
tribunal, however, the proceedings will never take place. In drafting
the compromis, the single most difficult problem may well be prevent-
ing one party from thwarting the arbitration by refusing to name an
arbitrator.
Although arbitration is sometimes conducted by a single arbitra-
tor, the more common practice is to conduct the proceedings before a
collegiate body of three or five members. 101 Where the collegiate body
format is used, each side chooses one member who in turn appoints one
or three neutral members, with one of the neutral members serving as
president of the tribunal.'02 The procedure can become more compli-
cated, however, when no provision has been made in the compromis for
compelling the constitution of the tribunal. Where the compromis is
silent on this point, the only available means under international law
for forcing a reluctant party to name its arbitrator is to bring the issue
before the International Court of Justice. The contentious jurisdiction
of the Court could be invoked where the parties have expressed consent
pursuant to article 36(1) of the Court's Statute.103 The Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction could also be invoked under article 36(2) of the Stat-
ute, where all parties involved have filed a declaration of consent to be
bound.' °4 Where neither basis of jurisdiction exists, the parties will be
100. See, e.g., [1958] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 35, at 5-8 (I.L.C. MODEL
RULES, arts. 3, 8, 9, 10).
101. J.L. SIMPSON & H. Fox, supra note 66, at 81-82.
102. Id.
103. Article 36(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states: "The juris-
diction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force."
104. Article 36(2) states:
The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recog-
nize as compulsory i0so facto and without special agreement, in relation to any
other State accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal
disputes concerning:
(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation;
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without remedy, absent provisions in the compromis. As a practical
matter, it seems unlikely that a party determined to thwart the arbitra-
tion proceedings would consent to the I.C.J.'s contentious jurisdiction
by a separate agreement. In the case of the NASA/ESA Agreement,
there are no treaties in force between the United States and all of the
ESA member governments which would confer jurisdiction on the
Court in a case arising under the NASA/ESA Agreement. Under these
circumstances, it would be risky for the United States and the ESA
member states to rely on contentious proceedings before the I.C.J. to
resolve their disputes over the constitution of the tribunal. Likewise, it
would be futile to rely on the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court for a
resolution of the matter. Not all ESA members have filed declarations
under the optional clause of the I.C.J. Statute; notably missing are dec-
larations from France and Germany, the two largest contributors to the
Spacelab venture. 105 If these states did not participate in the proceed-
ings, a resolution by the I.C.J. would be meaningless.
Given the infeasibility of resorting to the I.C.J. to constitute the
tribunal, it seems most advisable for the parties to the NASA/ESA
Agreement to provide for some sort of third-party assistance in case of
failure to name an arbitrator. This is the tested means of insuring that
arbitrators will be chosen in spite of disagreement between the parties.
There is ample precedent for this procedure in the making of interna-
tional agreements. Some of the early general arbitration conventions
devised a roundabout means of selecting arbitrators, whereby the dis-
putants each named a neutral third state to choose the arbitrators. This
scheme was incorporated into the 1907 Hague Convention 0 6 and the
1928 General Act; 10 7 its major disadvantage was that any party wishing
to delay or stop the arbitral proceedings could easily refuse to nominate
a neutral third-party state. The modem approach has been to provide
in advance for a single third party to select the arbitrators for the
disputants.
The third party is now most often an official of a respected interna-
tional organization rather than a neutral state. The President of the
I.C.J. or the U.N. Secretary General is often named in these agree-
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.
105. Id. The latest French declaration terminated on Jan. 10, 1974. S. ROSENNE, Docu-
MENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 272 (1974). As of July 31, 1981, the only
ESA members to have filed declarations under the optional clause are Belgium, Denmark,
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 1980-1981 I.C.J.Y.B. 55-89.
106. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 10, art. 45.
107. 1928 Act, supra note 15, art. 23.
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ments; sometimes the parties call upon the head of a standing organiza-
tion which manages affairs regarding a particular area that is the
subject matter of the dispute. The INMARSAT Agreement is one ex-
ample of an agreement calling for selection of arbitrators by the I.C.J.
President, or Vice President, if the President is disqualified for being of
the same nationality as one of the parties. 108 This arrangement is also
found in a number of the bilateral transport agreements, including the
1946 Agreement on Air Transport Services between the United States
and France."°9 The I.C.J. President may act at his discretion in decid-
ing whether or not to accept this function; the Statute of the Court does
not impose an obligation on him to do so. The President may refuse to
act where he thinks that he may prejudge some matter which may come
before the Court, or prejudice the settlement.' 0
Under the Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects I 1 and the proposed amendments to the Con-
vention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and other Matter,"12 assistance will be rendered by the U.N. Secretary
General in the event of failure to designate an arbitrator. The Liability
Convention provides for selection of the Chairman of the tribunal by
the Secretary General should the named arbitrators fail to reach agree-
ment on this point." 3 If no appointment of arbitrators is made, the
chairman named by the Secretary General will constitute a one-mem-
ber claims commission." 4 The Marine Waste Convention provides
that the Secretary General will select the tribunal chairman from an
agreed list of qualified persons nominated by the contracting parties.
The Chairman will then request the uncooperative party to nominate
an arbitrator. If no nomination is made, the Chairman will select the
arbitrator from the list.' ' 5
108. INMARSAT Agreement, supra note 32, Annex, art. 3.
109. March 27, 1946, art. 19, 61 Stat. 3445, T.I.A.S. No. 1679 (as amended March 19,
1951, 2 U.S.T. 1033, T.I.A.S. No. 2257) [hereinafter cited as U.S.-France Air Transport
Agreement]. The I.C.J. President selected an arbitrator under this provision in a 1963 arbi-
tration proceeding between these two governments. 16 REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 5, 12
(1963).
110. J.L. SIMPSON & H. Fox, supra note 66, at 84.
111. March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter cited as Liability
Convention].
112. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONVEN-
TION ON PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION, S. ExEc. Doc. I, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Marine Waste Convention].
113. Liability Convention, supra note 111, art. 15.
114. Id. art. 16.
115. Marine Waste Convention, supra note 112, art. 3.
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Some of the bilateral air transport agreements provide examples of
arbitration agreements calling for selection of arbitrators by a neutral
head of a specialized organization. The President of the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is sometimes called upon to desig-
nate arbitrators under these agreements; 1 6 an Agreement for Air
Transport Services between the United States and Italy provided that
the ICAO President may on request of either contracting party appoint
arbitrators." 7 Under the INTELSAT Agreement, a standing eleven-
member panel is to be nominated for the purpose of dispute settlement
with the members of the panel to be chosen from a list submitted by all
parties to the agreement." 8 The Chairman of this panel is then respon-
sible for naming arbitrators for the disputing parties." 9 Under the In-
ternational Telecommunications Convention,12 0 each party to a dispute
is to choose an arbitrator, who will then choose the president of the
arbitral tribunal. Where these two arbitrators fail to select the tribunal
chairman, the Secretary General of the International Telecommunica-
tions Union will draw lots between the two nominees suggested by the
already seated tribunal members. 2 '
Selection of arbitrators by the U.N. Secretary General or by an-
other organizational head has some advantages over selectioAi by the
President of the International Court of Justice. The potential conflict
with the judicial duties of the I.C.J. President is not a factor under the
former arrangements, and an organizational head may be less inhibited
than the I.C.J. President in making his choice. However, an organiza-
tional head may be less acquainted with the international lawyers from
whom the arbitrators are to be selected.' 2 The choice of arbitrators by
the head of a standing council will be particularly useful in specialized
areas, where some expertise in the matters at hand will aid in the selec-
tion process.'2 3 Of course, with regard to the NASA/ESA Agreement,
it will be impossible to entrust the selection of arbitrators to the chair-
116. See T. BUERGENTHAL, su.pra note 30, at 176.
117. Air Transport Agreement, Feb. 6, 1948, U.S.-Italy, art. 12, 62 Stat. 3729, T.I.A.S.
No. 1902 (terminated May 31, 1967).
118. INTELSAT Agreement, supra note 31, Annex C, art. 3.
119. Id. art. 5.
120. Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 1761, T.I.A.S. No. 4892, Annex 4.
121. Id.
122. J.L. SIMPSON & H. Fox, supra note 66, at 85.
123. The U.S.-France Air Transport Agreement, supra note 109, at art. X -P?,-ides that
the President of the I.C.J. shall make the appointment after consultation with the ICAO
Council President, thus attempting to combine the advantages of both arrangements.
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man of a specialized international organization, as none exists. 124 Most
likely, the third party would be the I.C.J. President or U.N. Secretary
General.
As a final point, the parties concluding a compromis should bear in
mind that the International Court of Justice has held that the normal
sequence of events in constituting an arbitral tribunal progresses in
three steps. First, each disputant selects one national member to repre-
sent it on the tribunal. Next, a third neutral member is appointed by
either the parties or the two existing tribunal members. Failing this,
the neutral member is appointed by an outside authority.12 The Court
held that absent express provisions showing intent to depart from this
sequence, provisions in peace treaties for the third party appointment
of a neutral tribunal member will apply only after each party has taken
the first step of appointing a national member.'26 The International
Telecommunications Convention'27 and the U.S.-Italian Air Transport
Agreement 128 are examples of agreements following this sequence;
however, it is possible for the parties to depart from this pattern by
express agreement. The Space Liability Convention allows the U.N.
Secretary General to appoint a single-member claims commission; 2 9
likewise, the INMARSAT Agreement 3 ° and the U.S.-French Air
Transport Agreement' 3' allow the I.C.J. President to take the first step
of appointing a natiorial member.
The above brief survey of schemes for constituting the tribunal
does not consider the simplest solution of all; it is possible for the par-
ties to merely name the arbitrators in the compromis. This would be
the best way for NASA and ESA to deal with the problem of constitut-
ing a tribunal, but where this cannot be negotiated in the compromis,
some form of third-party assistance provides a means for compelling a
resolution of this issue. In no case should the constitution of the tribu-
nal be left unresolved by the compromis. Given the impossibility of
invoking the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. against major ESA
participants, this would leave parties wishing to arbitrate with no rem-
124. See Sloup, Peaceful Resolution of Outer Space Conflicts, 20 DE PAUL L. REv. 618,
690-92 (1971).
125. Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950] I.C.J. 227, 228-29.
126. Id.
127. Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 1761, T.I.A.S. No. 4892, Annex 4.
128. Air Transport Agreement, supra note 117.
129. Liability Convention, supra note 111.
130. See INMARSAT Agreement, supra note 32.
131. See U.S.-France Air Transport Agreement, supra note 109, art. 10.
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edy against parties wishing to halt the proceedings by uncooperative
behavior.
D. The Subject Matter of the Dispute (Arbitrability)
The final critical question in concluding a compromis under the
paclum de contrahendo involves defining the subject matter competence
of the arbitral tribunal. Although the clauses under discussion are
dezigned to allow arbitration of a broad range of dispute situations,
their scope is not completely unlimited. When the parties to the
NASA/ESA Agreement negotiate the compromis, it will be necessary
to look to the language of the Agreement, Memorandum, and Contract
to see whether their disagreement is truly subject to the language of the
dispute resolution clauses. Once it is ascertained that the dispute falls
within the scope of the general agreement, the compromis itself must be
carefully drafted so that its language covers all the elements of the par-
ticular disagreement.
The first problem relating to arbitrability is whether negotiation is
a condition precedent to arbitration. Customary international law does
not require that the parties attempt to negotiate their differences before
submitting them to arbitration. 3 ' Nonetheless, some international
agreements require that negotiations be conducted before arbitration as
a means of narrowing the issues.'33 The NASA/ESA Agreement is one
such arrangement, as all the clauses under discussion state that arbitra-
tion is to occur only after negotiation has taken place.134 As a practical
matter, it will be difficult to prove whether or not a dispute can be
resolved by negotiation. Tribunals called upon to decide this question
will no doubt defer to the judgment of a state that a dispute cannot be
settled by means short of arbitration. 35
Once it is decided that an issue is ripe for arbitration, the subject
matter of the dispute must be defined. It is often said that nonlegal
disputes are not arbitrable. Article 38 of the 1907 Hague Convention 136
restricts the Convention's coverage to "questions of a legal nature," and
legal commentators have frequently expressed support for this view. 137
Many arbitration conventions have provided for arbitration of nonlegal
132. T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 30, at 130 n.24.
133. Id. at 130.
134. See text of the clauses at text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
135. Case of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, [1924] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 15;
T. BUERGENTHAL, supra note 30, at 130-31.
136. 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 10.
137. L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 51, at 29-30.
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disputes, however; the General Act of 1928 is one such example.' 38
The NASA/ESA clauses fall into the latter category, for like the Gen-
eral Act they contemplate arbitration of "any disputes,"'39 including
nonlegal disputes.
A further distinction should be made between article 12 of the
Agreement and article XIV of the Memorandum of Understanding.
Article 12, which was negotiated between governments, is aimed at
higher-level disputes that "seriously and substantially prejudice the ex-
ecution of the cooperative programme." Article XIV, negotiated be-
tween the government agencies, covers lower-level disputes over the
"interpretation or implementation of the terms of this cooperative pro-
gramme." Disputes to be settled by arbitration would have to fit into
one of the areas defined by these clauses; however, the clauses are
drafted so broadly that it is difficult to imagine a situation in which
they would not be construed to apply.
Once the parties conclude their compromis, the issue to be arbi-
trated will be more limited than that described under articles 12 and
XIV. At this stage, disagreement may arise over whether a particular
issue connected with the dispute falls within the scope of the undertak-
ing to arbitrate expressed in the compromis. Where the tribunal has
been constituted or where means exist for constituting it independently
of an uncooperative party, the tribunal may decide whether an issue
falls within the parties' definition of the subject matter in dispute.
Where there is no means of constituting the tribunal, recourse to the
International Court of Justice may be the only way to resolve these
questions. As was seen above,140 however, the I.C.J. will be unable to
assist where there is no expression of consent by the parties to its juris-
diction. In any event, even where the jurisdiction of the I.C.J. is suc-
cessfully invoked, the effectiveness of a decision that a dispute is
arbitrable will ultimately depend on whether means exist to constitute
the tribunal. If none are available, the parties will still only have a
pactum de contrahendo.
The foregoing discussion has shown that when viewed in the light
of international law, the clauses in the NASA/ESA Agreement are
quite workable. Article 11 (B) of the Agreement specifically covers dis-
putes involving the sharing of payments for liability arising from dam-
age caused by space objects, an area which is frequently the subject of
138. 1928 Act, supra note 15, art. 21.
139. See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
140. See text accompanying notes 103-05 .upra.
141. J.L. SIMPSON & H. Fox, supra note 66, at 79.
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arbitration. The general provisions of articles 12 of the Agreement and
XIV of the Memorandum are also workable, despite, and perhaps be-
cause of, their generality. These provisions cover foreseeable and un-
foreseeable disputes arising under the NASA/ESA Agreement and are
drafted broadly enough to allow the parties to use the most appropriate
means of dispute resolution under the circumstances. Should the par-
ties decide to submit to arbitration under these provisions, such basic
issues as the constitution of the tribunal, the applicable law, and the
subject matter of the dispute will have to be negotiated, but this fact
does not render the provisions unworkable. Great flexibility is needed
to cover the many issues which may arise, and the parties will find
many examples from international law to guide them.142 It should be
kept in mind, however, that where one or more of the parties has a
fundamental objection to resolving a dispute by arbitration, the process
will not be of much use. Arbitration is basically a consensual proceed-
ing, and there must be some fundamental agreement as to its use be-
tween the parties before it will succeed.143 Where this fundamental
agreement exists, however, these clauses will provide an adequate
framework within which to institute arbitral proceedings.
III. SUBMITTING A DISPUTE TO ARBITRATION
UNDER UNITED STATES DOMESTIC LAW
In examining the U.S. domestic issues which the NASA/ESA
Agreement presents, the major problem to be addressed is whether a
dispute involving the United States government may be submitted to
arbitration by executive agreement or whether this must be done by
treaty with the advice and consent of the Senate."4
Although there is no express authority in the U.S. Constitution for
international agreements other than treaties,14 the legal validity of the
executive agreement has long been recognized in practice. The first ex-
ecutive agreements were concluded in 1792, to provide for interna-
tional postal service.'4 6 Since then, the executive agreement has
become an indispensable means of doing business with foreign nations
142. Id. at 154; K.S. CARLSTON, supra note 35, at 30-31.
143. von Mangoldt, supra note 10, at 489.
144. For the purposes of this discussion, the term "executive agreement" will be used to
refer to binding international agreements entered into on behalf of the United States by the
executive acting alone, without Senate advice and consent. For a further discussion of what
constitutes a binding international agreement, see Rovine, Separation ofPowers andInterna-
tional Executive Agreements, 52 IND. L.J. 397, 401-02. (1977).
145. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 173 (1972).
146. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 239 (1792).
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and is generally considered to be on equal legal footing with the
treaty. 147 Today, the executive agreement is used more frequently than
is the treaty in conducting U.S. foreign affairs. 148 The sharp increase in
the use of executive agreements has been attributed to the growth in the
number of nations since World War II, increased U.S. activity abroad,
and the broadening range of subject matter handled between modem
states. 149 Besides the numerical increase in the number of executive
agreements employed by the United States government, change has oc-
curred in the means by which they are negotiated. Agencies within the
executive branch which formerly had little to do in the area of foreign
affairs are now entering into executive agreements with foreign
governments. 15
0
These developments have added to the confusion which has al-
ways existed regarding the appropriate use of international executive
agreements. Congress and the executive branch have long been em-
broiled in controversy over when executive agreements may legally be
used, with Congress struggling to maintain control over U.S. foreign
affairs and the executive branch vying for more freedom to act inde-
pendently of congressional control."'5 The ongoing debate has not pro-
duced a clear definition of the requirements for submission of a dispute
involving the U.S. government to arbitration. The last widespread dis-
147. See L. HENKIN, supra note 145, at 180, 184-87.
148. In 1946, the United States entered into 19 treaties and 139 executive agreements. In
1976, it entered into 13 treaties and 385 executive agreements. Rovine, supra note 144, at
398.
149. Id. at 406-07.
150. See generally Kuchenbecker, Agency-Level Executive Agreements. A New Era in
U.S. Treaty Practice, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1979).
151. In the last decade, in the wake of United States involvement in Vietnam, Congress
renewed its attempts to institute controls over executive action, including the 1972 "Case-
Zablocki Act," which requires the transmission to Congress of all international agreements
other than treaties within 60 days after execution. Pub. L. No. 92-403 86 Stat. 619, codified
at 1 U.S.C. 112(b) (Supp. V 1975). See also S. RES. 85, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 115 CONG. REC.
17245 (1969) ("National Committments Resolution," providing that no significant commit-
ment by the United States to a foreign state could be made absent affirmative action of both
the executive and legislative branches); S. RaS. 434, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC.
S 114515-17 (daily ed. June 30, 1976) ("Treaty Powers Resolution," an internal Senate proce-
dural rule which allowed funding for a non treaty agreement considered to require submis-
sion as a treaty to be blocked by a point of order objection of any Senator); Treaty powers
Resolution.: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on For. Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976);
Congressional Review of International Agreements: Hearings be/ore the Subcomr'm on Inter-
national Security and Scientqc Affairs ofthe House Comm. on Int'l Rels., 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Review of InternationalAgreements]; Congressional
Oversight of Executive Agreements: Hearings be/ore the Subcomm. on Separation ofPowers
ofthe Senate Comir. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
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cussion of this question took place during the era of the general arbitra-
tion treaty.1 52 When asked to ratify the general treaties of the pre-
World War II era, the Senate consistently demanded that any compro-
mis concluded under such an agreement be subject to its advice and
consent.153 The reservations to the 1907 Hague Convention and the
Treaty of Interamerican Arbitration are two typical examples of the
restrictions imposed by the Senate on the general treaties for the peace-
ful settlement of disputes.154 Similar reservations effectively barred ten
identical general arbitration treaties with France, Germany, Switzer-
land, Portugal, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, Austria-Hungary, Mexico,
Norway, and Sweden in 1904 and 1905.
55
Since World War II, arbitration agreements have become more
specialized, 156 but uncertainty in this area has not subsided. 15 7 Arbitra-
tion agreements have been concluded with and without the Senate's
advice and consent, with little discussion of the underlying legal ration-
ale. It is important that this area of U.S. foreign relations be clarified
because reservations requiring Senate ratification of a compromis could
neutralize many of the advantages of arbitration agreements. Requir-
ing Senate consent would greatly slow the proceedings and upset the
often delicate negotiations involved. It would also make a third-party
selection of arbitrators more difficult and hamper the tribunal in decid-
ing such issues as the applicable law or the subject matter of the dis-
pute. It is thus necessary to reexamine the available guidelines for
executive agreements in general and to apply them to the NASA/ESA
Agreement. The following issues must be confronted in deciding
whether an executive agreement is the proper form by which to submit
disputes to arbitration: 1) is there a proper source of constitutional or
other legal authority for making the agreement? and, if so, 2) is it pref-
erable-for constitutional or other reasons-to conclude the agreement
as an executive agreement rather than as a treaty?
In general, there are four sources of legal authority for executive
152. See, e.g., Garner, supra note 17; Murdock, Arbitration and Conciliation in Pan
America, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. 273 (1929); Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 POL.
Scl. Q. 385 (1905).
153. See Summers, supra note 6, at 575-82; W.S. HOLT, TREATIES DEFEATED BY THE
SENATE 204-35 (1933).
154. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
155. W.S. HOLT, supra note 153, at 204-05.
156. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
157. A recent case before the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the President's
authority to suspend claims in U.S. courts by U.S. citizens against the Iranian government,
and to submit these claims to arbitration. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
This issue is discussed more fully at notes 175-76 infra.
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agreements. 15s An executive agreement may be entered into pursuant
to and for the purpose of implementing particular treaty provisions or
in fulfillment of a legislative mandate. A third type of executive agree-
ment is concluded by an executive agency subject to subsequent con-
gressional approval. Finally, the agreement may emanate solely from
the "pure" power of the executive conferred by the Constitution.
59
The source of NASA's authority to engage in international cooper-
ative activity is found in its enabling statute. Section 2475 of the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 states:
The Administration, under the foreign policy guidance of the Presi-
dent, may engage in a program of international cooperation in work
done pursuant to this act, and in the peaceful application of the re-
sults thereof, pursuant to agreements made by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate.' 60
On its face, this section appears to preclude the use of executive agree-
ments, but upon signing the act in 1958, President Eisenhower added
an important gloss:
The new Act contains one provision that requires comment. Section
205 authorizes cooperation with other nations and groups of nations
in work done pursuant to the Act and in the peaceful application of
the results of such work, pursuant to international agreements en-
tered into by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
I regard this section merely as recognizing that international treaties
may be made in this field, and as not precluding, in appropriate cases,
less formal arrangements for cooperation. To construe the section
otherwise would raise substantial constitutional questions.'
6
'
The Senate apparently has acquiesced in the President's view, as this
has been the interpretation followed in practice.' 62
158. Congressional Review of International Agreements, supra note 151, at 14.
159. Id.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2475 (1958).
161. U.S. International Space Programs, Texts of Executive Agreements, Memoranda of
Understanding and Other International Arrangements, Memoranda of Understanding and
Other International Arrangements, 1959-1965, STAFF REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SENATE
COMM. ON AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, S. Doc. No. 44, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1965) (emphasis added).
162. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2475, NASA participates in two types of international negotia-
tion. Intergovernmental agreements, such as the Agreement under discussion between the
United States and the ESA governments, are negotiated and concluded by the State Depart-
ment on behalf of NASA, with NASA assisting insofar as is necessary. NASA also enters
into interagency agreements directly with its counterpart agencies abroad; the Memorandum
of Understanding attached to the NASA/ESA Agreement is an example of such an agree-
ment. Normally, cooperative agreements are concluded by interagency memoranda of un-
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Although it acknowledges that executive agreements may be con-
cluded in connection with NASA activities, President Eisenhower's
statement does not shed any light on what an "appropriate case" for an
executive agreement would be. It is generally agreed that where an
agreement is authorized by legislation, treaty, or some other source, the
executive has much discretion as to its formulation as a treaty or execu-
tive agreement. 63 It would seem to follow from President Eisen-
hiower's remarks regarding section 2475 that a compromis to arbitrate
disputes arising from a properly concluded executive agreement would
be legally authorized even without submitting it to the Senate for ad-
vice and consent. If this were not so, United States ability to enter into
cooperative space research programs abroad would be seriously ham-
pered. Therefore, when determining whether to conclude an agree-
ment as a treaty or executive agreement, it is not enough merely to
locate a source of legal authority for the arrangement selected. Com-
peting constitutional and practical considerations must also be taken
into account in deciding which form an international arrangement will
take. Most commentators have not attempted to develop precise rules
for determining whether an executive agreement or treaty should be
selected, asserting that this would involve the impossible task of defin-
ing the entire range of executive and congressional power under the
Constitution. Several general guidelines for the exercise of executive
discretion have been proposed, however.
One suggested test for the exercise of executive discretion stresses
practicality, extending the scope of executive power "to all the occa-
derstanding. Before concluding such an arrangement, however, NASA will consult in
advance with the State Department to determine whether an intergovernmental arrange-
ment would be more appropriate. An intergovernmental format is chosen when the commit-
ments involved require government-level support and are: 1) agreements embodying
commitments authorized by existing legislation or treaty, 2) agreements beyond existing leg-
islation or treaty, but subject to congressional approval or implementation, or 3) agreements
within the President's constitutional powers or within his powers as authorized by legislation
or treaty. Interagency agreements are generally used when the arrangement is fully within
the capability and legal authority of the United States agency and the counterpart foreign
agency. Normally these are of administrative or scientific character. Id. at 3-5. Apparently,
the United States government does not consider a memorandum of understanding in and of
itself to have binding international effect, as it has withdrawn from participation in pro-
grams negotiated in this fashion. This has occasionally caused friction between NASA and
ESA. See ES4 Considers Optionsfor Solar-Polar Mission, Av. WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept.
28, 1981, at 26; U.S/European Solar Mission Fate Keyed to N4S.4 Decision, Av. WK. &
SPACE TECH., Aug. 3, 1981, at 25.
163. Rovine, supra note 144, at 417.
164. Stevenson, ConstitutionalAspects ofthe ExecutiveAgreement Procedure, 66 DEP'T OF
STATE BULL. 840, 841-42 (1972).
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sions on which an international agreement is believed by the Chief Ex-
ecutive to be necessary in the national interest, but on which resort to
the treaty making process is impracticable or likely to render ineffective
an established national policy."' 6 5 Another approach relies on prece-
dent, requiring adherence to the "customs and practices which have
developed since the conclusion of the first executive agreements in the
early years of the Republic."' 66 A third criterion focuses on the cbnsti-
tutional requirement that Congress maintain control of the national
pursestrings. 167 These vague criteria have all been taken into consider-
ation in the State Department's Circular 175,168 which sets forth in
more concrete form the factors to be weighed by the executive branch
in deciding whether or not to conclude an agreement as a treaty. These
factors are:
a. the extent to which the agreement involves commitments or risks
affecting the nation as a whole;
b. whether the agreement is intended to affect state laws;
c. whether the agreement can be given effect without the enactment
of subsequent legislation by the Congress;
d. past U.S. practice with respect to similar agreements;
e. the preference of the Congress with respect to a particular type of
agreement;
f. the degree of formality desired for an agreement;
g. the proposed duration of the agreement, the need for prompt
conclusion. . . and the desirability of concluding a routine or short-
term agreement; and
h. the general international practice with respect to similar
agreements. 16
9
An application of these guidelines to the NASA/ESA Agreement
shows that from a purely practical point of view, there should be little
objection to arbitration by executive agreement. There is no effect on
the states in terms of requiring them to act or refrain from acting.
There is also no real long-term national commitment involved. Al-
though Spacelab is an important project which will greatly augment the
165. Lissitzyn, The Legal Status of Executive Agreements on Air Transportation, 17 J. AIR
L. & COMM. 436, 442 (1950).
166. Rovine, supra note 144, at 417, citing 121 CONG. REc. S20103 (daily ed. Nov. 14,
1975), 122 CONG. REC. S 1687 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1976).
167. Summers, supra note 6, at 568-69.
168. 11 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL ch. 700, reprinted in Congressional Review of Interna-
tional.4greements, supra note 151, at 387.
169. Id., ch. 721, reprinted at 392-93.
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capabilities of the Space Shuttle, failure of the program will not mean
the demise of the entire operation.
The implications of the program in terms of national security are
also not so great as to require Senate advice and consent. While Space-
lab does have military applications, the requirement that the United
States procure the second and subsequent Spacelab units from ESA
alone might arguably not preclude the Department of Defense from
obtaining necessary equipment from United States sources for defense
purposes. Article 5 of the Agreement provides that the United States
Government will "refrain from separate and independent development
of any [Spacelab] substantially duplicating the design and capabilities
of the first [Spacelab] unless the European Partners fail to produce such
[Spacelabs], components and spares in accordance with agreed specifi-
cations and schedules and at reasonable prices."' 70 It also prohibits the
United States Government from procuring from non-ESA sources such
Spacelab units "as substantially duplicate the design and capabilities of
the first [Spacelab], as are needed by the Government of the United
States of America, including needs arising from its international
programmes. . . ." These clauses can be construed so that defense-
oriented units fall outside their purview. A defense-oriented unit ar-
guably would not "substantially duplicate the design and capabilities"
of an ESA-produced Spacelab; furthermore, the requirement that ESA
produce the Spacelab units in accordance with agreed specifications
and at reasonable prices could be construed to provide an escape hatch
for the United States in case the NASA/ESA Agreement becomes dis-
advantageous in terms of national security.
Finally, speed and convenience may be preferable to formality in
concluding an arbitration agreement, as the amount of time needed for
Senate ratification could render such an agreement impracticable as a
dispute resolution. tool.
It is not immediately clear whether arbitration by executive agree-
ment would be permitted when the issue is viewed in the light of prece-
dent; the Senate's history of objection to arbitral agreements without its
170. See also Memorandum, art. VIII(2), which states:
NASA will refrain from separate and independent development of any SL sub-
stantially duplicating the design and capabilities of the first SL unless [ESA] fails to
produce such SLs. . . in accordance with agreed specifications and schedules and
at reasonable prices to be agreed. For any NASA SL programme requirements
which are not met by SLs developed under this cooperative programme, NASA
will have the right to meet such requirements either by making the necessary modi-
fications to the SLs developed under this cooperative programme, or by manufac-
turing or procuring another SL meeting such NASA requirements.
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consent has been discussed above.17 1 However, the Senate's reluctance
to accept the aforementioned general arbitration treaties without an ad-
vice and consent reservation can be explained by its unwillingness to
relinquish its control over a potentially unlimited range of dispute set-
tlement agreements. More recently, disputes in clearly defined areas
have been submitted to arbitration by executive agreement without
Senate unrest. In 1963, for example, the United States and France en-
tered by executive agreement into a compromis of arbitration 72 to set-
tle a dispute arising under their bilateral air transport agreement.
73
Since the NASA/ESA Agreement is confined to a particular coopera-
tive project of even more limited dimension than an air transport
agreement, it too can be distinguished from the general arbitration
treaties of the pre-World War II era. Given this distinction, a good
case can be made that precedent does not stand in the way of arbitra-
tion by executive agreement in the NASA/ESA situation.
The most significant problem to be encountered in determining
whether a dispute should be submitted to arbitration by executive
agreement is engendered by the constitutional requirement that Con-
gress control the payment of funds on behalf of the United States gov-
ernment. This requirement is embodied in 31 United States Code
section 665(a), which prohibits the creation of an obligation in excess of
the amount of appropriated funds. In making appropriations, Con-
gress is limited to expenditures authorized by law; Rule XXI-2 of the
Rules of the House of Representatives states that "[n]o appropriation
shall be reported in any general appropriation bill, or be in order as an
amendment thereto, for an expenditure not previously authorized by
" 174law. ...
These provisions are of particular concern when dealing with arbi-
tration under article 11 (B) of the NASA/ESA Agreement, which pro-
vides for arbitration regarding the payment of claims for damages
against the United States and the ESA governments as joint tortfeasors.
Although claims by United States citizens against foreign governments
were put to arbitration without Senate consent even in the days of un-
rest over general arbitration treaties, 17 5 claims by foreign nationals
171. See text accompanying notes 17-19, 152-55 supra.
172. Compromis of Arbitration on Air Transport Services, Jan. 22, 1963, U.S.-France, 14
U.S.T. 120, T.I.A.S. No. 5280, 16 REp. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 11, 68 (1963).
173. U.S.-France Air Transport Agreement, supra note 109.
174. L. DESCHLER, CONSTITUTION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL, & RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 426 (1967).
175. See 79 CONG. REC. 969-71 (1935), which lists 40 claims by United States citizens
which were put to arbitration without advice and consent, and W. MCCLURE, INTERNA-
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against the United States may only be submitted to arbitration where
the Senate has consented or where some other prior legal authority ex-
ists. This is because only the latter category of claims involved the pos-
sibility of the United States being held liable to pay. Thus, when asked
to comment on the legality of an arbitration clause in a contract be-
tween the United States Navy and a Swedish corporation which con-
templated payment of damages by the Navy to the corporation, the
United States Comptroller General said, "In the absence of statutory
authorization, either express or implied, officers of the government
have no authority to . . .agree to submit to arbitration claims which
they themselves would have no authority to settle and pay."
' 176
Because it involves the claims of foreign nationals against the
United States, payment of money under article 1 1(B) of the
NASA/ESA Agreement will have to be based on additional statutory
or equivalent authority. This authority is found within the article's lan-
guage. Article I(B) provides only for division of damages among the
United States and the ESA member governments in case they are held
jointly liable under the Liability Convention. 177 Thus, the decisive is-
sue of the joint liability of the United States Government is governed
by the Liability Convention rather than by the NASA/ESA Agreement
itself, which merely incorporates the provisions of the Liability Con-
vention. The Senate has ratified the Liability Convention, 78 indicating
that it has consented to pay damages where the United States Govern-
ment is found liable under the Convention's terms. A treaty ratified by
the Senate has been held to be a proper source of legal authority to
support an appropriation of funds; in 1906, payment to Germany of a
$40,000 claim adjudicated under the authority of a treaty was found to
be authorized by law under a precedent of the House of
Representatives. 179
Unlike the claims arising under article 1I(B), claims under the
general dispute resolution clauses of article 12 of the Agreement and
article XIV of the Memorandum of Understanding are not necessarily
covered by existing treaty provisions. Disputes submitted to arbitration
TIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 53 (1941), which lists 80 executive agreements liquidating
claims of United States citizens. For more modem examples, see Claims Settlement with the
People's Republic of China, U.S.-P.R.C., 30 U.S.T. 1957, T.I.A.S. No. 9306, and Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
176. 32 CoMP. GEN. 333-36 (1953).
177. See Liability Convention, supra note 111.
178. Id. The Senate gave its advice and consent on Oct. 6, 1972. The Convention was
ratified by the President on May 18, 1973, and entered into force on Oct. 9, 1973. Id.
179. 4 A.C. HINDS, PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, § 3644 (1907).
No. 21
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
by executive agreement under these clauses will have to be examined
on an ad hoc basis to see if it is foreseeable that the United States will
be held liable to pay an award. If no such award is contemplated and if
the expenses of the arbitration itself are small, no appropriation will be
necessary, and submission to arbitration by executive agreement will be
appropriate.1 80 Because an executive agreement is not a proper source
of legal authority for an appropriation, however,1 8 1 where expenses of
the arbitration are great or where an award against the United States is
foreseeable, a source of legal authority independent of the executive
agreement is necessary.
In the case of the NASA/ESA Agreement, one source of statutory
authority for payment of an arbitral award against the United States
may be found in 31 United States Code section 724(a). This section
appropriates on behalf of NASA "such sums as may be necessary for
the payment, not otherwise provided for, as certified by the Comptrol-
ler General, of final judgments, awards, and compromise settlements,
which are payable in accordance with the terms of section 2414. . . of
title 28. . .together with such interest and costs as may be specified in
such judgments or otherwise authorized by law." Section 2414 states:
Payment of final judgments rendered by a State or foreign court or
tribunal against the United States, or against its agencies or officials
upon obligations or liabilities of the United States, shall be made on
settlements by the General Accounting office after certification by the
Attorney General that it is in the interest of the United States to pay
the same.
Two questions arise under these sections. The first is whether sec-
tion 2414 is intended to cover arbitral awards. An arbitration panel is
arguably a "foreign tribunal" under the statute, even though the
United States government participates in the selection of the arbitra-
tors. The statute does not cover awards on its face; however, awards
are included in the list of payments authorized under section 724(a).
The second question goes to the intent of section 2414. Its legisla-
tive history appears to put a limitation on the use of its provisions. In
its previous form as enacted in 1956, its application was limited to judg-
ments of less than $100,000; the Senate Report states that its purpose
was to establish "a simplified procedure for the payment of routine
180. Summers, supra note 6, at 568. To meet the expenses of an arbitration, the State
Department may assign Foreign Service or State Department personnel for duty with the
tribunal, or obtain limited funds from its own Appropriations Act under the rubric of "Inter-
national Conferences and Contingencies." Id.
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judgments of State and foreign courts."' 8 2 Thus, where a potential
judgment may be unusually large or where it involves extraordinary
circumstances, it is conceivably not covered by the statute. Otherwise,
this legislation appears to authorize payments of awards by arbitral
tribunals. Except in extraordinary circumstances, there would be no
need to submit a compromis of arbitration concluded under the general
dispute clause to the Senate to satisfy the appropriations requirements.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The dispute clauses of the NASA/ESA Agreement provide a
workable structure for resolving differences by means of arbitration.
Article 11(B) binds the parties under international law to submit their
disputes to arbitration. The use of arbitration under the general clauses
will be contingent upon the willingness of the parties, but these provi-
sions also provide a workable setting in which to conduct arbitration
proceedings. Although there is little arbitral practice from which a cus-
tomary international law of arbitration between states can be derived,
parties drafting a compromis under the general clauses have a great
accumulation of models for formulating the proceedings. These could
easily be incorporated into their agreement to arbitrate, as the need
arises. The arbitration would also not be hampered by the U.S. domes-
tic law regarding executive agreements. Absent unusual circumstances,
there are no legal, practical, historical, or fiscal reasons for submitting a
compromis concluded under this Agreement for Senate ratification. In
short, arbitration is a viable alternative for settling disputes related to
this space age agreement.
182. S. REP. No. 733, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1961 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
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